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Plaintiffs-Appellees Clark hereby answer the petition for 
rehearing filed by Royal K. Hunt. 
I. THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS UNTIMELY FILED. 
The opinion from this court was issued and entered Friday, 
August 30, 1991. Rule 3 5(a) Utah R. App. P., states: 
A rehearing will not be granted in the absence 
of a petition for rehearing. A petition for 
rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 
14 days after the entry of the decision of the 
court, unless the time is shortened or 
enlarged by order. 
Hunt did not lodge his petition for rehearing until 
September 16, 1991, seventeen days after this court's decision was 
entered. Based upon Rule 35, the petition had to be filed by 
Friday, September 13, 1991. Since the petition was untimely filed, 
a rehearing should not be granted. 
II. HUNT HAS NO STANDING TO CONTEST THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
In his petition Hunt first claims that the default judgment 
had been assigned to Myers, who could proceed in the action in the 
name of Booth pursuant to Rule 25(c), U.R.C.P. This is not a new 
argument and is covered extensively in Appellee-Clark's brief in 
point V (page 26) . Hunt argues, however, that upon receiving 
notice, Myers did not appear at the rehearing to set aside the 
judgment because Meyer did not believe that the rehearing was "a 
meaningful hearing at a meaningful time and would not be served by 
a post-vacation remedy." (Petition, p. 4.) 
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To properly analyze Hunt's position, it is important to first 
understand the parties and their representation. Hunt filed this 
petition "pro se" in behalf of himself. Hunt's right and standing 
to raise issues in the petition are therefore restricted to his 
personal involvement in the case as a party. As this Court 
recognized in its decision, Hunt's personal interest arises only 
out of an assignment of a trust deed by Associate Financial 
Services, which assignment took place in February, 1988. Before 
this time, there is no evidence of any kind that Hunt had any 
personal interest in the property, in the counter-claim or in any 
other matter involved in the litigation. His prior involvement was 
as an attorney for Booth and/or Myers. 
The default judgment was taken in April, 1987, and was set 
aside in August, 1987, approximately 6 months before Hunt had any 
personal interest in the case. Associates never claimed any 
interest in the counterclaim filed by Booth. Therefore, Hunt (pro 
se) has no standing to challenge any part of this Court's or the 
trial court's ruling regarding the setting aside of the default 
judgment. 
III. MYERS HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE SETTING ASIDE OF 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Even though Hunt filed this petition in behalf of himself only 
and even though Myers was not a party to this appeal, Hunt 
nonetheless argues in behalf of Myers that this Court should 
consider Myers' position because Myers could proceed in the name of 
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Booth, the original judgment creditor- Clarks strenuously object 
to Hunt indirectly representing Myers even though he claims not to 
represent Myers. 
One of the most difficult aspects of this case has been Mr. 
Hunt's evasiveness and inconsistent positions. For example, when 
plaintiffs moved to set aside the default judgment, Hunt appeared 
and indicated that he did not represent Myers, but suggested to the 
court that there may be a due process problem since the court had 
not given notice of the motion to Myers. This representation was 
made, despite the fact that Hunt was assisting Myers in the 
execution issued from the default judgment. Thereafter when Myers 
and Hunt were again served with notice of a rehearing on the Motion 
to Set Aside, neither he nor Myers appeared or objected. After 
this Court rendered its decision that Myers thereby waived his 
right to challenge the order setting aside the judgment, Hunt now 
represents Myers' position that there has been no waiver. Hunt 
conveniently disclaims or represents the interests of various 
parties, depending upon what position is convenient for his current 
argument. 
Hunt's argument fails for other reasons as well. Rule 25(c) 
U.R.C.P. indicates that if an interest is assigned, the assignee 
may proceed under the assignor's name. However, Booth made a 
formal assignment to Myers that was filed as a matter of record (R. 
44-45) Therefore, Myers was the interested party of record, and by 
failing to object at the hearing or by failing to appeal the order 
3 
setting aside the judgment, Myers has no claim through Hunt's 
petition for rehearing; nor does Hunt have any right of any kind 
to assert Myers' claim herein. 
Finally, Hunt argues that, "Myers did not appear [at the 
second hearing on the Motion to Set Aside] because due process 
would require notice and a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time 
and would not be served by a post-vacation remedy." (Petition, p. 
4) There is no evidence whatsoever to support the factual basis of 
this statement, since Myers never appeared at any time before the 
trial court or before this Court. In any event, the assertion is 
false. There was nothing unmeaningful about the hearing or time 
provided to Myers to appear and present his case regarding why the 
default judgment should not be set aside. The prior order setting 
aside the judgment was not a final order and could have easily been 
vacated or modified. 
IV. HUNT'S RULE 11 SANCTION IS NOT "DOUBLE RECOVERY." 
Hunt next argues that the motion for sanction was actually a 
"motion for fees already included in the decree," (Petition p. 5) 
and the sanction is therefore double recovery. A quick perusal of 
the record will show this statement is untrue. The motion for 
sanctions, memorandum in support and court order clearly 
demonstrate that the motion was not used as a guise for some other 
purpose. The sanction was a punishment, not a compensatory award. 
It's purpose was to punish and discipline Hunt for violating Rule 
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11. Since a sanction is not designed to compensate but to punish, 
"double recovery11 is irrelevant. There is no authority whatsoever 
that a sanction must be a set-off or a reduction from compensable 
damages. Otherwise the very purpose of Rule 11 (to punish) would 
be frustrated. 
V. HUNT RAISES NO NEW ISSUE REGARDING THE CLAIM OF NON-
FINALITY OF THE FORECLOSURE ORDER. 
The issue of non-finality of the foreclosure decree has been 
fully briefed in the appellants and reply brief. No new facts or 
legal support have been advanced by Hunt in his petition. This 
Court has thoroughly examined Hunt's position on this issue and has 
ruled. It is a waste of judicial time to again revisit the same 
issue without something significantly new being advanced. 
VI. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD STAND. 
Hunt asserts that, after Associates assigned its interest to 
Hunt and he personally became a party on February 26, 1988, "he 
made and filed any number of objections to the award of attorneys 
fees." (Petition, p. 8.) This is not true and he gives no 
citation to any record to support this allegation. The award of 
attorneys fees had been fully litigated and determined by the trial 
court prior to February 1, 1988, when the judge executed the decree 
of foreclosure. It is true that Hunt objected to the award of 
sanctions after February 1, 1988, however, there was no further 
proceeding regarding the foreclosure fees. As discussed above, a 
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sanction is not a compensatory award for attorneys fees. An 
objection to the sanction therefore is not an objection to the fees 
awarded pursuant to the foreclosure action. 
Concerning Booth's standing to challenge the attorneys fees, 
Hunt asserts that Booth suffered actual injuries, yet cites nothing 
in the record to support the allegation. Since Booth had 
transferred all of his interest in the property months before the 
foreclosure action commenced and he therefore had no equity in the 
property, he has no right to challenge any aspect of the fees and 
expenses awarded by the court. Hunt claims, however, that Booth 
"was entitled to possession of the property" during relevant times. 
Hunt again makes this allegation without any reference to the 
record. It was this same unfounded factual assertion that Judge 
Frederick determined was untrue and was part of the basis for the 
Rule 11 sanctions. Yet, Hunt continues to make this argument in 
his petition. This claim, even if true, does not belong to Hunt. 
Hunt's petition was filed only in behalf of himself "pro se," and 
Hunt cannot properly raise this issue in behalf of Booth in any 
event. 
After arguing that Booth had an interest in the property, Hunt 
then argues on page 10 of his petition that the attorneys fees were 
improper because there were only four recorded interest holders in 
the property (Gurr, the Lockhart Company, Draper Bank & Trust, and 
Co-vest Corp.). Thus only these four parties were necessary 
parties in the foreclosure proceedings. This statement confirms 
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that Hunt knew Booth did not have an interest in the property. 
Hunt then represents that there is no evidence in the record to 
support the court's assertion that there were other encumbrances 
besides Gurr and Lockhart. (Petition, p. 11.) This is also untrue 
and was fully discussed in appellee's brief. It was necessary for 
plaintiffs to bring the foreclosure action against all of the named 
defendants in order to obtain insurable title. See R. 220, 230-46, 
292. 
Assuming Hunt has the right to challenge the attorneys fees, 
the mere assertion that there is insufficient evidence to support 
the award is improperly made. Hunt has not met his duty to 
marshall all of the evidence which supports the judge's ruling as 
required on appellate review. E.g. Morgan v. Quailbrook 
Condominium Co. , 704 P.2d 573, 577 n.3 (Utah 1985). There is ample 
evidence to support the award, particularly in retrospect since 
this matter has been appealed without an award of attorneys fees. 
VII. BOOTH HAD NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY DURING RELEVANT 
TIME PERIODS. 
Hunt argues on page 12 of his petition that Booth's possessory 
interest in the property is admitted in the record. Again, Hunt is 
trying to argue the claim of Booth which he cannot do "pro se." 
Putting that aside, this point illustrates more cogently why 
sanctions were awarded against Hunt. 
At the beginning when Hunt represented Booth, Hunt pursued a 
bogus counter-claim, alleging that Booth held an interest in the 
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property and was damaged by the actions of the plaintiffs. This 
counter-claim was made despite the fact that Booth had transferred 
all of her interest in the property many months before the alleged 
wrongful actions by Clarks. Hunt then surreptitiously proceeded to 
take default on the counter-claim and in silence, tried to execute 
on the very property on which the Clarks were foreclosing. Hunt 
was cunningly taking away the Clarks' claim to foreclosure. When 
the default judgment and execution were discovered by Clarks, they 
immediately moved to set aside the judgment. Hunt then claimed 
improper notice to Myers. When proper notice to Myers was given, 
Hunt then claimed the notice to be meaningless. Then depositions 
of Mr. and Mrs. Booth were taken and the testimony was unrefuted 
and clear that Booth had no interest in the property after she had 
transferred her interest in May, 1987, and under any circumstance, 
Booth would have no interest at least by August, 1987 (months 
before any alleged misconduct by the Clarks) when the property 
again changed hands to another third party. 
Based upon clear and unrefuted evidence by the Booths, Judge 
Frederick awarded sanctions against Hunt and Booth for filing the 
meritless counter-claim. Thereafter, Hunt continued to assert the 
validity of Booth's default judgment on appeal. When this court 
affirmed the lower court, Hunt again represents to the court, 
"Booth held a possessory interest in the property upon which she 
based her claims against plaintiffs. The allegations of possessory 
interest is admitted in this record.11 Hunt cites no record nor is 
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there any record to support this contention. On the contrary, 
Booth's own testimony clearly establishes the contrary. 
It appears that the sanctions against Mr. Hunt still have had 
no effect. Granting Hunt's petition for rehearing will only 
reinforce Hunt's distorted perspective of filing meritless claims 
and then trying to justify the wrongdoing by technicalities. 
CONCLUSION 
Hunt filed this petition "pro sefl and cannot argue the 
positions of Booth or Myers. The Court has fully considered and 
addressed previously in its decision all issues raised by Hunt in 
his petition. This Court should therefore deny his petition for 
rehearing. 
DATED this jZ^May of December, 1991. 
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